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Executive summary 
This report examined trends in information and consultation of 
employees at British workplaces between 1990 and 2004, using 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey panel data. 
Information disclosure to employees increased significantly 
between 1990 and 1998, but largely stabilised between 1998 and 
2004; notwithstanding that during both periods though there were 
significant fluctuations across size of workplaces with larger 
workplaces providing more information.  
Between 1990 and 1998 the strongest predictors of information 
disclosure were the initial level of disclosure, the level of 
managerial sophistication, and the existence of joint consultation. 
Between 1998 and 2004 they were the initial level of disclosure, 
and company financial performance. 
While between 1990 and 1998, information disclosure had a 
significant positive impact on financial performance, this 
relationship did not hold between 1998 and 2004. The conundrum 
is that between 1990 and 1998, disclosure was found to have a 
positive effect on financial performance, while between 1998 and 
2004 the relationship was reversed with financial performance 
having a positive influence on disclosure. 
Aims and objectives 
The study charts the trends in information and consultation of 
employees between 1990 and 2004 in Britain. It also investigates the 
determinants of information disclosure and its outcomes. It explores the 
importance of voice mechanisms (such as direct participation, indirect 
participation via joint consultation, and involvement via trade unions) 
and high performance work practices in explaining information sharing. 
Finally, it examines whether information and consultation of various 
kinds have a pay-off in terms of employment relations climate, 
productivity, and profitability.  
Background 
This research is particularly relevant in the context of the recently 
introduced Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) Regulations 
(2004). The research maps the terrain on which the Regulations are being 
introduced, identifies drivers, and provides a basis for future evaluation 
of the workings of the regulations and policy assessments. 
To date most of the research in this area has been limited by the use of 
cross-sectional data. This report uses panel data to gain a better 
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understanding of the causal relationships between the different variables 
under study.  
Patterns of information disclosure 
On average, information provision by management to employees across 
British establishments increased significantly between 1990 and 1998. By 
contrast, between 1998 and 2004 information disclosure remained stable, 
or even fell slightly. 
In both time periods there were significant fluctuations in levels of 
information disclosure across establishments. The very largest 
workplaces were more likely to provide information. Generally the 
smaller the workplace, the less likely it was to share information. 
Between 1990 and 1998, there was an increase in information provision 
across all size bands; however, the biggest and only significant increase 
came with smaller workplaces over this period. From 1990 to 2004, 
middle-sized workplaces (50 – 199) saw a small increase, while all the 
others experienced a decline, though none of these changes were 
significant. 
Antecedents of information disclosure 
The antecedents of information disclosure differed across the two time 
periods. In other words, the factors that help to explain variations in 
information disclosure across establishments between 1990 and 1998 
were not the same as those that help to explain variations in disclosure 
between 1998 and 2004. 
Between 1990 and 1998, the strongest predictor of disclosure was the 
level of disclosure at the beginning of the period, followed by the level of 
managerial sophistication, and the existence of joint consultation 
arrangements at the workplace. As hypothesised, all three sets of 
relationships were positive. 
Between 1998 and 2004, the strongest predictor of disclosure was also 
the level of disclosure at the beginning of the period, followed by the 
financial performance of the establishment. Both sets of relationships 
were positive. 
Consequences of information disclosure 
The consequences of information disclosure also differed across the two 
time periods. Between 1990 and 1998, information disclosure had a 
significant positive impact on establishment financial performance, but 
not on the climate of employee relations. Between 1998 and 2004, on the 
other hand, information disclosure was not related either to financial 
performance or to the employee relations climate at the workplace. 
More generally, between 1990 and 1998, information disclosure was 
found to have a positive effect on establishment financial performance, 
while between 1998 and 2004 the relationship was reversed with 
establishment financial performance having a positive influence on 
disclosure. 
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1 
Introduction 
Information disclosure by employers to employees varies significantly 
between workplaces in the UK. It has changed over time, with an 
apparent increase in provision up to the late 1990s and a levelling off 
thereafter. In addition, there has been considerable fluctuation over time 
in the rank ordering of workplaces and no overall convergence in levels 
of disclosure provision. This requires explanation, because various 
strands of literature would suggest the likelihood of high and rising 
levels of disclosure by employers.  
Arguments in economics and accounting literatures suggest that firms 
have an interest in maximum disclosure. Such disclosure reduces 
uncertainties and opportunism and leads to more efficient outcomes. 
Constraints on information sharing may be the costs of information 
processing, the loss of proprietary secrets, and the loss of advantage vis-
a-vis other parties (Stigler 1961; Williamson, 1985; Healy and Palepu 
2001; Verecchia 2001). However, overall, a strong strand in the 
economics and accounting literatures suggest that firms have a strong 
incentive to disclose. Second, several strands of Human Resource 
Management (HRM) and Industrial Relations (IR) literatures also see 
firms as having an incentive to disclose, again subject to cost 
constraints, but with benefits outweighing costs (Walton and McKersie 
1965; Aoki 1988; Pfeffer 1998). Third, there is a body of legal-institutional 
analysis that builds on the fact that the state has intervened and 
mandated disclosure by employers to employees. In the UK there has 
been a steady build-up in such legal requirements over time (Gospel, 
Lockwood, and Willman, 2003; Gospel and Willman, 2005). Such legal 
requirements are likely to increase levels of information disclosure and 
may increase uniformity in information provision. Thus, economic, 
institutional, and legal arguments suggest higher levels, some increase 
in disclosure over time, and some upward convergence between firms. 
Yet, as stated, a more complex pattern is observed in the UK. 
To date, research on information provision has been limited and 
restricted to a small number of countries. On determinants, early US 
research showed that more information is disclosed and there is more 
uniformity in its content where there is a trade union (Kleiner & Bouillon, 
1988). Later, Japanese research suggests that more information is 
provided by firms in Japan than in the US. Also, in Japan, trade unions, 
and especially unions perceived by management to be cooperative, have 
a positive effect on disclosure. Joint consultative committees alone, 
without a union presence, elicit less information and the content of 
information is of a more operational and less strategic kind (Morishima, 
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1989; 1991). The latter author suggests that differences may be related to 
national culture. Equally, they may reflect different ‘games’ – in 
cooperative games more is disclosed than in conflictual games. For the 
UK, recent work by Peccei et al. (2006) shows that disclosure is positively 
associated with the level of information possessed by management, the 
extent to which management perceives the workforce shares their 
values, and the degree of financial difficulty experienced by the 
workplace. It is also associated with the existence of voice mechanisms, 
with direct participation, trade unions, and joint consultative committees 
having a positive effect in that order of significance. However, increasing 
the number of voice mechanisms does not increase the amount of 
information provided.  
On outcomes, the US work by Kleiner and Bouillon (1988) suggested that 
information provision was positively related to wage levels, but 
unrelated to productivity, in both union and non-union settings. 
However, later US research (Lawler et al. 1998, 2001; Benson and Lawler, 
2003) suggests that information sharing is positively related to both 
quality effects and financial performance. Japanese research (Morishima 
1989, 1991) shows both “process benefits” for the firm in terms of 
shorter and smoother wage negotiations with unions and also “outcome 
benefits” in the form of lower labour costs and higher productivity and 
profitability. Again, this may reflect different national and institutional 
contexts and different underlying games. For the UK, recent work by 
Peccei et al. (2005) suggests that greater disclosure can have a positive 
effect on performance. However, the story is complex in that there is 
only a small direct impact and the main effect depends on contingent 
factors, especially the type of information provided and the level of 
employee commitment. 
Though suggestive, to date most of this work has been limited by the 
use of cross-sectional data. This poses problems with the establishment 
of causality and the exploration of non-recursive relationships. In this 
report, the 1990-98 and the 1998-2004 Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey (WERS) panel surveys are used to explore trends in information 
disclosure and outcomes. Specifically, we articulate hypotheses 
concerning determinants and outcomes of information provision, using a 
set of management practices, voice arrangements, and shock effects. 
These are then tested on the WERS panel data. The article is organised 
as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the main trends in information provision. 
Chapter 3 develops the main hypotheses concerning outcomes and 
determinants of information sharing to be tested in the study. Chapter 4 
outlines the data set and the methods used in the analysis. Chapter 5 
presents the key findings. Finally, Chapter 6 discusses the results more 
broadly and considers theoretical and policy implications. 
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2 
Patterns of information 
disclosure: 1990-1998 
and 1998-2004 
In order to develop testable hypotheses, the broad pattern of information 
disclosure must be outlined. Tables A1a and A1b in Appendix A use the 
WERS panel surveys for 1990-98 and 1998-2004. They provide data on 
three items of information provision (investment plans, staffing plans, 
and the financial position of the enterprise). An index of the three is also 
constructed. The different figures in the two columns for 1998 reflect 
differences between the panel covering the years 1990-98 and 1998-2004.  
Table A1a reveals the following patterns. First, there are substantial 
differences in the proportion of workplaces providing information on 
different topics. Thus, the largest proportion of workplaces provided 
information on the financial position of the establishment. This was 
followed by information on staffing plans. Perhaps not surprisingly, the 
lowest proportion of managements shared information on investment 
plans.  
Second, information provision increased significantly over the period 
1990 to 1998. By contrast, from 1998 to 2004, information disclosure fell 
slightly. The table also shows that, whereas the proportion of workplaces 
where there was no change in the amount of information provided 
remained roughly stable at just over one third, there were considerably 
more workplaces showing an increase in the first period than in the latter 
when substantially more workplaces showed a decrease. In sum, over 
time, there is an inverted L-shape or hinge-like pattern of information 
provision.  
Third, the table provides correlations between levels of information 
disclosure in the two time periods. It shows significant, but still relatively 
low, correlations between levels of disclosure in both the 1990-98 and 
the 1998-2004 periods. This suggests substantial volatility or churning in 
the position of establishments. The table also provides a measure of 
variance that shows a small decrease in both time periods. However, this 
is not sufficient to suggest an overall compression or convergence in 
levels of information disclosure across establishments in either time 
period. 
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Finally, Table A1b provides data for the information disclosure index, by 
workplace size. This suggests that the largest workplaces (500 or more) 
were more likely to provide information. The smaller the workplace, the 
less likely it is to share information. Between 1990 and 1998, there was 
an increase in information provision across all size bands; however, the 
biggest and only significant increase came with smaller workplaces over 
this period. For 1990 to 2004, middle sized workplaces (50 – 199) saw a 
small increase, while all the others experienced a decline, though none 
of these changes was significant. 
There are various sets of phenomena to be explored. First, it is necessary 
to explain the increase in information provision between 1990 and 1998 
and then the levelling out between 1998 and 2004. Second, it is 
necessary to explain the variance or churning in workplaces in terms of 
information provision. There is also the question as to whether the 
drivers of information disclosure are the same or different for the two 
time periods. Third, there is the question of whether information 
provision has any effect on outcomes.  
We turn now to the literature and to perspectives on information 
disclosure to develop the hypotheses that will be tested in the rest of the 
report.  
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3 
Research hypotheses 
The basic explanatory framework underpinning the research is shown 
schematically in Figure 1. Elements of this framework will be extended 
and refined as we present the main hypotheses, which are listed in Table 
A2 in Appendix A.  
Figure 1.  Basic research framework 
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Outcomes of information disclosure 
The focus of the report is on two key outcomes that have received 
considerable attention in the literature and for which data are available 
for both the 1990-98 and the 1998-2004 WERS panels. These are the state 
of employee-management relations, or the employee relations (ER) 
climate at the workplace, and the financial performance (FP) of the 
establishment. Drawing on Peccei et al. (2005), the report focuses on a 
number of specific arguments linked to broad theoretical perspectives 
about the relationship between information disclosure, ER climate and 
financial performance.  
As noted by Peccei et al. (2005), central to one perspective, as articulated 
in some of the contemporary HRM literature, is the idea that information 
disclosure by management to employees is good practice and is likely to 
have a consistently positive effect on various aspects of organisational 
performance. Specifically, existing theoretical and empirical work in the 
field of HRM suggests that the sharing of information with employees, 
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either alone or in combination with other ‘progressive’ human resource 
(HR) practices, has a positive effect on performance outcomes 
(Appelbaum et al., 2000; Guest et. al., 2000; Ichniowski et al., 1996; 
Lawler et al., 1998, 2001).  
A number of possible explanations have been proposed. The most 
common argument is goal alignment, where disclosure operates to bring 
the parties closer together on the basis of shared understanding and 
information in what one might broadly characterize as integrative 
bargaining. This can take a variety of forms (Peccei et al., 2005), but, 
broadly speaking, information sharing is seen to contribute to 
organisational performance by helping to align individual and 
organisational goals, thereby enhancing employee commitment and 
integration at work. This, in turn, can be expected to enhance the type of 
cooperative and discretionary forms of employee behaviour that, in the 
aggregate, can significantly contribute to the overall performance of the 
organisation (McElroy, 2001; Meyer and Allen, 1997; Organ, 1988; Pfeffer 
and Veiga, 1999). Similar arguments in the industrial relations and 
bargaining literatures suggest that more open communication between 
management and unions is likely to lead to an alignment of the goals of 
employees and unions with the firm which, in turn, should help to lower 
opportunism and ultimately lead to better performance outcomes 
(Walton and McKersie, 1965; Aoki, 1988).  
Unlike the 1998 and 2004 WERS cross-section surveys, the WERS panel 
surveys do not include any direct information on goal alignment or on 
employee commitment. However, to the extent that information 
disclosure does indeed lead to greater goal alignment and, hence, to 
greater employee integration, lower opportunism, and more cooperative 
forms of behaviour, we would expect such disclosure to be associated 
with a more positive ER climate. In the present study, therefore, the state 
of employee-management relations is used as an indicator of goal 
alignment and, based on the arguments outlined above, the following 
outcome-related hypothesis is proposed:  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Information disclosure will have an indirect positive 
effect on establishment financial performance through its positive impact 
on the climate of employee relations at the workplace. 
The above hypothesis explicitly theorises ER climate as an intervening 
variable mediating the relationship between disclosure and financial 
performance. As such, the hypothesis presupposes two sequential 
causal links – one between information disclosure and employee 
relations climate (ID-ERC), and then a subsequent link between employee 
relations climate and financial performance (ERC-FP). To test such a 
causal chain requires longitudinal panel data covering a minimum of 
three, and preferably four, waves of measurement. The WERS panel data 
are not of this kind, since, as explained more fully below, they consist of 
two separate panels, one for 1990-98 and the other for 1998-2004, each 
covering two separate waves of measurement at the beginning and end 
of the respective time periods. As a result we were unable to formally 
 9
test hypothesis 1. However, the hypothesis was tested indirectly by 
looking at the ID-ERC and the ERC-FP links separately in each of the two 
time periods. Failure of either of these two links to attain significance 
would provide prima facie evidence that ER climate is unlikely to mediate 
the relationship between disclosure and performance.  
As noted by Peccei et al. (2005), there are other factors that may help to 
account for the positive performance effects of information disclosure. 
Disclosure may, for example, contribute to performance by enhancing 
employee motivation and in-role behaviour (Hackman and Oldham, 
1980), or by helping to focus employee effort at work (Locke and Latham, 
1990). To the extent that these alternative mechanisms are operative and 
effective, disclosure can be expected to have a separate additional direct 
effect on performance, above and beyond any effect that it may have 
through its impact on goal alignment and the climate of employee 
relations at the workplace. This possibility is captured in the second 
outcome-related hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Information disclosure will have a direct positive 
effect on establishment financial performance, above and beyond any 
indirect effect through the climate of employee relations at the 
workplace.  
Future work might be carried out involving a more contingency type 
explanation. In other words, the impact of information disclosure on 
performance might vary depending on a series of other factors that 
affect and moderate the relationship between disclosure and the 
outcomes of interest (Peccei et al. 2005).  
Antecedents of information disclosure 
Up to now the paper has focused on the impact of information disclosure 
on ER climate and financial performance. In so doing, we have assumed 
that the relationship between disclosure and the other two variables is 
recursive and unidirectional. In other words, the assumption has been 
that disclosure influences performance and ER climate but not the 
reverse. As discussed more fully below, existing theory and research 
suggests, however, that the causal ordering between these variables 
may well be in the opposite direction, with establishment financial 
performance and ER climate influencing information disclosure rather 
than the other way around. Or, at the very least, it suggests that, over 
time, these variables are likely mutually to influence each other so that 
performance and ER climate may well be antecedents, as well as 
outcomes, of disclosure. Hence the decision to include these two 
variables as both antecedents and outcomes of information disclosure in 
the research framework presented in Figure 1. An important aim of the 
present study, in fact, is to use the WERS panel data to gain a better 
understanding of the causal ordering between these variables. 
A number of studies have considered the causal links between 
information-sharing and performance (Cressey et al., 1985, Lawler et al. 
1998; Pfeffer 1998). Most recently, Peccei et al. (2006) have suggested 
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that the financial position of the workplace may well have a significant 
influence on information disclosure by management. Specifically, 
drawing on Cressey, et al. (1985), they argue that, in order to obtain 
concessions and forestall negative action, management is likely to share 
more information with employees in bad times. They also suggest that 
management is more likely to share information when it trusts the 
workforce and perceives that employees are committed to the values of 
the organisation. Using the 1998 WERS cross-section, Peccei et al. (2006) 
found support for the idea that management is more likely to share 
information with employees when the financial performance of the 
establishment is poor and when it perceives a greater degree of goal 
alignment amongst the workforce. Based on these arguments and 
results, an alternative set of antecedent-related hypotheses in which 
performance and ER climate are explicitly treated as predictors of 
disclosure are proposed:  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Management will be more likely to disclose 
information in workplaces characterised by a more positive climate of 
employee relations. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Management will be more likely to disclose 
information when the financial performance of the establishment is poor. 
Apart from organisational performance and the state of employee-
management relations, there are a number of other factors that are likely 
to affect information disclosure. The report focuses on five additional 
factors that have been identified as potentially important antecedents of 
disclosure in previous studies and for which data are available in both 
WERS panels.  
The first factor is managerial sophistication (competent and confident), 
which can be expected to have a positive effect on disclosure for several 
reasons. First, more sophisticated managements are likely to be more 
confident than less sophisticated ones and, therefore, more open to the 
idea of sharing information with employees. Second, sophisticated 
managements are likely to be under greater normative pressure to share 
information since information-sharing is, in itself, likely to be a highly 
visible indicator and symbol of the sophistication and progressiveness of 
management. Third, the notion of managerial sophistication is similar to 
the management capacity variable that, in the 1998 WERS cross-section, 
Peccei et al (2006) found to be a significant antecedent of the disclosure 
of general information in UK establishments.  
The next set of antecedents to be considered includes the three voice 
mechanisms shown in Figure 1. In line with previous research, all three 
mechanisms can be expected to be associated with higher levels of 
information-sharing (Lawler, 1989; Cully et al., 1999; Millward et al., 
2000). For example, using the 1998 WERS cross-section, Peccei et al. 
(2006) found all three mechanisms had a positive impact on the 
disclosure of general information at establishment level. The recognition 
of a trade union for collective bargaining had the strongest effect, 
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followed by the existence of direct participation arrangements, and then 
the presence at the establishment of joint consultation arrangements.  
The last potential antecedent of information disclosure is the level of 
disclosure in the previous time period. The argument here is that once 
management shares information with employees, it may be more 
difficult not to continue to do so since the act of disclosure may create 
expectations amongst the workforce for management to do more of the 
same in the future. This type of lock-in or path dependency argument 
suggests that disclosure at one point in time will exert some positive 
causal influence on disclosure at a future date.  
Based on the above arguments and evidence, the following additional 
set of antecedent-related hypotheses are suggested: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Management will be more likely to disclose 
information where its level of sophistication is higher. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Management will be more likely to disclose 
information where it recognises a trade union for collective bargaining. 
Hypothesis 7 (H7): Management will be more likely to disclose 
information where there are join consultation arrangements in place in 
the workplace. 
Hypothesis 8 (H8): Management will be more likely to disclose 
information where there are direct participation arrangements in place in 
the workplace. 
Hypothesis 9 (H9): Management will be more likely to disclose 
information when disclosure was higher in the previous time period.  
Future work might be carried out involving a more contingency type 
explanation. In other words, the antecedents of information disclosure 
may vary depending on a series of other factors that affect and moderate 
the relationship between various antecedents and disclosure. 
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4 
Data and method 
Data 
The present research is based on a multivariate analysis of two of the 
panel surveys from the Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS) series. The WERS series consists of five surveys, conducted in 
1980, 1984, 1990, 1998 and 2004. The first three surveys were 
representative of the population of British workplaces with 25 or more 
employees, but in 1998 the size threshold was reduced to include 
workplaces with ten or more employee, and in 2004, the threshold was 
further lowered to include workplaces with between five and nine 
employees. The WERS datasets comprise both panel and cross-section 
elements. The panel is constructed by revisiting a sample of the 
workplaces which took part in the previous cross-section survey. The 
manager responsible for employment relations at these continuing 
workplaces is asked a subset of the questions from the previous cross-
section survey, as well as additional questions on changes which have 
occurred at the workplace since the last interview.  
The two panel surveys used in this paper are those for the periods 1990 
to 1998, and 1998 to 2004. In total 882 workplaces took part in the 1990 to 
1998 panel, and 956 in the 1998 to 2004 panel. Owing to the extension of 
the cross-section survey to workplaces with ten or more employees in 
1998, the 1998 to 2004 panel was nationally representative of workplaces 
with ten or more employees, whilst the 1990 to 1998 panel was 
representative of workplaces with 25 or more employees.  
Although the follow-up interview for the panel survey mostly asked 
managers identical questions to the earlier cross-section survey, some of 
the questions asked on the cross-section surveys have changed over 
time. As a result of this there are differences in the questions used to 
measure some items reported in this paper between the two panel 
surveys. These differences will be highlighted in the following 
description of variables. Descriptive statistics for the dependent, 
independent and control variables are given in Table A1a (see Chapter 2) 
and Table A3 in Appendix A.  
Dependent variables 
The disclosure of information by managers to employees was measured 
by a three-item scale which reflected whether the workplace provided 
employees with information on internal investment, staffing plans, and 
the financial position of the establishment at the time of the follow-up 
survey i.e. in 1998 for the 1990 to 1998 panel, and in 2004 for the 1998 to 
2004 panel. There was a difference between the two panel surveys in the 
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way this information was collected. In the 1990 to 1998 panel, managers 
were asked whether management gave employees or their 
representatives ‘a lot’, ‘a little’ or ‘no’ information about internal 
investment plans, the financial position of the establishment, or staffing 
or manpower plans before implementing any changes in them.  
By contrast, in the 1998 to 2004 panel survey managers were asked 
whether they regularly gave employees or their representatives any 
information on internal investment plans, the financial position of the 
establishment, and staffing plans. In order to aid comparison between 
the two panel surveys, the information on the amount of information 
provided on each of the three topics available in the 1990 to 1998 panel 
was collapsed into a dichotomous measure of whether managers 
provided any information on each of the topics. It was not possible to 
address the fact that the 1990 to 1998 panel did not ask whether 
information was provided on a regular basis. A three-item scale was 
constructed for each panel survey, showing the number of topics on 
which managers provided information to employees. Table A1a shows 
the proportion of workplaces which disclosed information on each of the 
three items and the mean score of the indices constructed for both panel 
surveys.  
Independent variables 
The performance of the workplace was assessed by managers’ ratings of 
the financial performance of the establishment relative to the industry 
average. Managers were asked to rate the financial performance of the 
workplace as a ‘lot’ or a ‘little’ above or below average or about average 
compared to other establishments within the same industry. This scale 
was collapsed into a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
performance was assessed as above average, average, or below average 
in order to aid interpretation (Table A3). 
The climate of employee relations was determined by managers’ ratings 
of the relationship between management and employees at the 
workplace. The 1990-1998 panel survey asked managers to rate relations 
on a seven-item scale, ranging from ‘very good’ to ‘very poor’, whilst the 
scale was compressed to five-items in the 1998-2004 panel. As with the 
measure of financial performance, these scales were compressed into a 
dichotomous variable which identified workplaces where the relationship 
was rated as good, or better than good, rather than where the 
relationship between managers and employees was viewed less 
positively (Table A3). 
The independent variables fell into two categories; those which were 
observed at the first point in time, and those which measured change 
between the first and second interviews. Measures of information 
disclosure and the indicators of financial performance and climate at the 
time of the first survey were constructed in the same way as the three 
related items based on the follow-up survey (described in the section on 
dependent variables). A three-item index of management sophistication 
indicated whether the employer used a high (defined as above-average) 
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number of communication methods, kept records on a high number of 
items, or whether there was a personnel representative on the board, or 
governing body of the establishment. A slightly different measure of 
management sophistication was developed for the 1998 to 2004 panel to 
reflect differences in the available items between the two panels. This 
alternative measure again took into account whether managers used a 
high number of communication methods, but substituted managerial 
target-setting for record keeping, and took whether the workplace had a 
strategic plan which covered employee development as an indicator of 
management sophistication rather than the presence of a personnel 
specialist on the governing body.  
Three voice mechanisms were included as independent variables, 
although a workplace could potentially have any combination of these 
practices. An establishment was said to engage in direct participation in 
the period from 1990 to 1998 where it made use of quality circles or 
problem solving groups or held regular briefings among work groups or 
teams at least once a month as a matter of policy.  
The measures available in the 1998 to 2004 panel were rather different, 
as the frequency of such activities was not considered. In both panel 
surveys a Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) was said to exist where 
there was a committee of managers and employees which discussed a 
range of topics, but which engaged in consultation rather than 
negotiation. Finally, union recognition was defined as recognising a 
union for the purposes of negotiating pay and conditions for a section of 
the workforce at the establishment. As an alternative to these voice 
measures, changes in the use of these measures between 1998 and 2004 
were also used as independent variables.  
Control variables  
Only a limited range of control variables available on the two panel 
surveys remained consistent over time. However, by carrying out a 
multivariate analysis it was possible to take out the impact of the size of 
the workplace, whether it was a single independent establishment or 
part of a larger organisation, the sector of ownership (public or private 
sector), and the gender composition of the workforce, making it possible 
to observe the true relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables.  
In addition, both panel surveys contained information on important 
changes which had occurred at the workplace over the period since the 
first survey. The list of possible changes ranged from those which were 
likely to have a relatively minor impact on the workplace, such as a 
change of name, to more severe shocks, such as a change of ownership. 
An index of shocks was constructed and included in all analyses as a 
control. The index ranged from zero to seven to indicate the number of 
changes that occurred at the workplace over the period of the panel 
survey.  
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Method 
Where the amount of information disclosed was used as the dependent 
variable, the multivariate analysis was carried out using ordered probit 
regressions, appropriate where the dependent variable is ordinal. Where 
financial performance or the climate of employee relations at the 
workplace was the dependent variable, probit regressions were used as 
these measures were dichotomous.  
Stata 9.2 SE was used to apply probability weights to the data, making 
the findings representative of the population of British workplaces with 
25 or more employees which continued in existence over the period 
from 1990 to 1998 and of workplaces with ten or more employees which 
survived from 1998 to 2004. As the multivariate analysis controlled for 
workplace size, the fact that the 1998 to 2004 panel contained workplaces 
with ten to 24 employees does not affect the comparability of the 
findings between the two panel surveys. 
Analysis procedures 
All study hypotheses were tested using lagged effect estimation models. 
In a lagged effect model using two-wave panel data, the value of the 
dependent variable at the second wave of measurement (T2) is assumed 
to be a function of the value of the dependent variable and of the 
hypothesised independent variable at the first wave of measurement 
(T1). For example, in terms of hypothesis 9 that predicts that the financial 
performance of the establishment will affect information disclosure by 
management, a lagged effect model specification would stipulate that for 
the 1990-98 period, information disclosure in 1998 is a function of 
disclosure in 1990 and of financial performance in 1990.  
In other words, a lagged effect model essentially posits that financial 
performance in 1990 (the independent variable at time 1), has an effect 
on disclosure in 1998 (the dependent variable at time 2), controlling for 
the effect of disclosure in 1990 (the dependent variable at time 1) on 
disclosure in 1998. By controlling for the value of the dependent variable 
at time 1, such a lagged structure provides an effective way of estimating 
the causal effect from the independent variable at time 1 on the 
dependent variable at time 2 (Finkel, 1995) and, therefore, of testing for 
the hypothesised causal links between study variables.  
Because of the length of the time lag involved in both the 1990-98 and 
the 1998-2004 panels, future work could test the study hypotheses using 
alternative mixed instantaneous and lagged effect estimation models.  
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These mixed models stipulate that the value of a dependent variable at 
time 2 is a function of the value of the dependent variable at time 1 and 
of the value of the independent variable at both time 1 and time 2 (Finkel, 
1995). In essence, mixed models of this kind enable one to examine the 
extent to which the value of a dependent variable at time 2, controlling 
for its value at time 1, is a function not simply of the value of the 
independent variable at time 1, but also of any change in the value of the 
independent variable between the two time periods. This report is 
restricted to the results of the lagged effect estimation analysis outlined 
above. 
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5 
Results 
Outcomes of information disclosure 
The results on the impact of information disclosure on the climate of 
employee relations and the financial performance of the establishment 
(Hypotheses 1 and 2) are reported in Table A4 in Appendix A. Equations 
1 and 2 show the results for the 1990-98 panel using ER climate and 
financial performance, respectively, as the dependent variables in the 
analysis. Equations 3 and 4 show the parallel set of results for ER climate 
and financial performance for the 1998-2004 panel. It is worth noting, 
however, that while establishment size was found to be positively related 
to the dependent disclosure variable in all the analyses, none of the 
other controls attained significance in any of the regressions.  
As can be seen from equation 1, contrary to hypothesis 1, information 
disclosure in 1990 was not significantly related to the climate of 
employee relations in 1998, controlling for ER climate in 1990. Moreover, 
contrary to hypothesis 1, ER climate in 1990 also failed to show a 
significant relation to financial performance in 1998, controlling for 
performance in 1990. In contrast, equation 2 shows that, in line with 
hypothesis 2, information disclosure in 1990 had a significant positive 
effect (at the ten per cent level) on establishment financial performance 
in 1998, controlling for financial performance in 1990. Taken together, 
these results suggest that ER climate is unlikely to mediate the 
relationship between disclosure and performance. At the same time, 
however, they suggest that information disclosure has a direct (lagged) 
positive effect on subsequent levels of performance. As such, the results 
for the 1990-98 panel provide support for the direct effect hypothesis 
(H1), over the mediation one (H2).  
Equations 3 and 4 show that the results obtained for the 1998-2004 panel 
were substantially different in that none of the relevant lagged 
relationships attained significance in this second time period. In other 
words, the 1998-2004 panel data failed to provide support to either of our 
outcome-related hypotheses (H1 and H2), thereby suggesting that, 
contrary to expectations, information disclosure in this time period did 
not have a significant (lagged) influence either on the ER climate at the 
workplace, or on the financial performance of the establishment.  
Antecedents of information disclosure 
The results on the antecedents of information disclosure (Hypotheses 3 
to 9) are reported in Table A5 in Appendix A. Equation 1 shows the 
results for the 1990-98 panel, while equation 2 shows the parallel results 
for the 1998-2004 panel.  
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For the 1990-98 data, equation 1 shows that three of the seven potential 
antecedents included in the analysis had a significant impact on 
information disclosure. Specifically, in line with hypothesis 5, managerial 
sophistication in 1990 was found to be significantly positively related to 
information disclosure in 1998, controlling for information disclosure in 
1990. In line with hypothesis 7, the existence of joint consultation 
arrangements in 1990 also had a significant positive effect on 
information disclosure in 1998, once again controlling for disclosure in 
1990. In accordance with the path dependency hypothesis (H9), the level 
of information disclosure in 1990 was found to have a strong significant 
positive effect on the level of disclosure in 1998. All the other 
hypothesised antecedents of disclosure, namely employee relations 
climate, establishment financial performance, trade union voice, and 
direct participation arrangements, failed to attain significance in the 
1990-98 analysis, thereby failing to provide support for hypotheses 3, 4, 6 
and 8.  
The non-significant results for ER climate and financial performance are 
of particular interest, especially when viewed in conjunction with the 
previous set of results relating to the outcomes of information 
disclosure. As mentioned earlier, disclosure in 1990 had a significant 
positive (lagged) effect on financial performance in 1998, controlling for 
performance in 1990.  
The reverse, however, was not the case. In other words, financial 
performance in 1990 did not have a significant (lagged) effect on 
information disclosure in 1998, controlling for disclosure in 1990. This 
unbalanced pattern of cross-lagged effects suggest that, at least in the 
1990-98 period, the causal ordering between the two variables is from 
disclosure to performance rather than the other way around. In other 
words, the 1990-98 results suggest that it is disclosure that influences 
performance rather than the reverse and that performance, therefore, is 
best thought of as an outcome rather than as an antecedent of 
disclosure.  
In contrast, disclosure in 1990, as shown earlier, did not have a 
significant (lagged) influence on ER climate in 1998, controlling for ER 
climate in 1990. However, ER climate in 1990 also did not have a 
significant (lagged) influence on disclosure in 1998, controlling for 
disclosure in 1990. These non-significant cross-lagged effects suggest 
that, at least in terms of 1990-98, disclosure and ER climate are not 
causally related and that climate, therefore, is neither a significant 
antecedent, nor a significant outcome, of information disclosure.  
As equation 2 shows, once again, the antecedent results for the 1998-
2004 period are substantially different. In this case, only two of the 
hypothesised antecedents of disclosure emerged as significant in the 
analysis. Specifically, information disclosure in 1998 had a strong 
significant positive impact on disclosure in 2004. This is in line with the 
path dependency hypothesis (H9) and parallels the results obtained for 
the 1990-98 period. Unlike in 1990-98, however, the only other 
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antecedent that attained significance in 1998-2004 was the financial 
performance variable. In line with hypothesis 4, financial performance in 
1998 was significantly positively related (at the ten per cent level) to 
information disclosure in 2004, controlling for disclosure in 1998. None 
of the other antecedent hypotheses (H3, H5, H6, H7 and H8) received 
support in the 1998-2004 data.  
In light of the previous results relating to the outcomes of information 
disclosure for 1998-2004, once again, the antecedent results for ER 
climate and financial performance in equation 2 are of particular interest. 
The lack of any significant cross-lagged effects either between disclosure 
in 1998 and ER climate in 2004, or between climate in 1998 and 
disclosure in 2004, confirms the 1990-98 results and suggests the 
absence of any clear causal link between these two variables. In contrast, 
the pattern of cross-lagged effects between disclosure and financial 
performance is directly opposite to that found for the 1990-98 period.  
Specifically, as can be seen from Tables A4 and A5, the 1998-2004 
pattern of cross-lagged effects suggests that, unlike in 1990-98, the 
causal ordering between the two variables is from performance to 
disclosure rather than the other way around. Unlike the 1990-98 results, 
therefore, the 1998-2004 results suggest that it is performance that 
influences disclosure rather than the reverse. For the second time period, 
therefore, performance is best thought of as an antecedent rather than as 
an outcome of disclosure.  
Summary 
Overall, the tests of the outcome and antecedent hypotheses presented 
above produced a rather mixed set of results. Five points stand out in 
particular.  
First, the results for 1990-98 tend, on the whole, to be slightly stronger 
than those for 1998-2004. By and large, the effects observed for the 1998-
2004 panel, whether in relation to outcomes or antecedents, tended to be 
weaker than those observed for the 1990-98 panel.  
Second, our results show that by far the strongest predictor of 
information disclosure in both time periods is the level of disclosure in 
the previous period, thereby providing clear support for path 
dependency arguments in this area.  
Third, apart from the level of disclosure in the previous time period, 
none of the factors that emerged as significant in either the outcome or 
the antecedent analysis were the same across the two time periods. In 
other words, our results suggest that both the antecedents and 
outcomes of information disclosure are different in the two time periods.  
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Fourth, and contrary to expectations, we found no clear causal link 
between disclosure and the climate of employee relations at the 
workplace. Moreover, this applied across both time periods.  
Finally, our results show that the causal ordering between disclosure and 
establishment financial performance varied across the two time periods. 
In 1990-98 performance was found to have a lagged influence on 
disclosure, while in 1998-2004 the relationship was reversed and it was 
disclosure that had a lagged influence on performance.  
 21
6 
Discussion 
Further analysis will be required to interpret these results more fully. In 
particular, it would be useful to test some less universalistic and more 
contingent hypotheses, introducing more complex interaction between 
variables.  
For the present, we find that the antecedents of information disclosure 
and the outcomes differ across the two time periods. The most stable 
finding is the path dependency one, specifically that the strongest 
predictor of information disclosure in a given time period is the level of 
disclosure in the previous period. The aggregate finding, that 
information disclosure rose between 1990 and 1998 but stabilised 
between 1998 and 2004, provides context. 
The finding on path dependency implies that information disclosure may 
be part of an overall management employee relations policy, rather than 
a response to a specific set of circumstances such as financial distress. 
However, given our previous finding that financial distress is associated 
with increased disclosure (Peccei et al. 2006), there may be important 
triggers to disclosure followed by ratchet effects sustaining it.  
With regards to aggregate trends, it is not clear why the period 1990-8 
should be associated with a rise in disclosure; there are no obvious 
legislative triggers, except the slow and small build-up of legislative 
requirements for information provision in specific circumstances such as 
collective redundancies and transfer of undertakings. Nor is it clear why 
disclosure stagnated between 1998-2004. It is not, given the levels of 
disclosure shown in Table A1a, a saturation effect and there remains 
substantial scope for increases in disclosure given a legislative trigger. 
With only two panels, one cannot say which of the two time periods 
provides the more curious pattern. Future research needs to address this 
issue.  
The inconsistency of relationships with antecedents and outcomes 
across the two periods implies disclosure is a complicated phenomenon. 
In previous work (Peccei et al. 2005 and Peccei et al. 2006) we have 
speculated that disclosure of information might be part of very different 
distributive or integrative bargaining ‘games’ played between 
management and employees. Moreover, these games work differently 
under different sets of representative and participative arrangements. 
Again, further work on the dynamics of disclosure at establishment level 
is necessary. 
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Appendix A: 
Supplementary tables 
Table A1a.  Information disclosure 1990-2004: Descriptive statistics 
 1990-1998 panel 1998-2004 panel 
Variable description 1990 1998 1998 2004 
Provide information on:     
Investment plans 43% 
(2.8) 
59%*** 
(2.8) 
55% 
(3.6) 
51% 
(3.7) 
Financial position of workplace 63% 
(2.7) 
78%*** 
(2.4) 
69% 
(3.3) 
64% 
(3.5) 
Staffing plans 64% 
(2.7) 
73%*** 
(2.4) 
63% 
(3.6) 
64% 
(3.6) 
Disclosure index (average of 3 
items) 
1.70 
(0.06) 
2.11*** 
(0.05) 
1.87 
(0.08) 
1.78 
(0.07) 
     
Change in means:     
Investment plans  15.98***  -3.4 
Financial position of workplace  14.7***  -5.1 
Staffing plans  9.8***  0.70 
Index (3 items)  0.41***  -0.09 
     
Change in information provision:     
Increase  45%   28% 
Decrease  19%   34% 
No change  37%   37% 
     
Correlations:     
Investment plans  0.18***  0.12 
Financial position of workplace  0.26***  0.37*** 
Staffing plans  0.26***  0.24*** 
Index (3 items)  0.34***  0.37*** 
     
Variance (standard error):     
Information disclosure     
Investment plans 2.8 2.8 3.6 3.7 
Financial position of workplace 2.7 2.4 3.3 3.5 
Staffing plans 2.7 2.4 3.6 3.6 
Index 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.07 
     
Source: WERS 1990-1998 and 1998-2004 panel surveys. Base: Workplaces with 25 or more employees for 1990-1998 panel, and  with 10 or 
more employees for the 1998-2004 panel. Figures are weighted and based on responses from at least 818 managers for the 1990-1998 panel 
and on at least 923 managers for the 1998-2004 panel. Standard errors are in parentheses. The picture of stability in information disclosure 
over the period from 1998 to 2004 was also observed when the sample was restricted to workplaces with 25 or more employees. ***indicates 
difference between the two observations significant at the 1 per cent level; **difference significant at the 5 per cent level; * difference 
significant at the 10 per cent level. 
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 Table A1b.  Information disclosure index by workplace size, 1990-2004 
 1990-1998 panel 1998-2004 panel 
Variable description 1990 1998 1998 2004 
Workplace size:     
10-24 - - 1.82 
(0.15) 
1.55 
(0.15) 
25-49 1.71 
(0.11) 
2.13*** 
(0.10) 
1.89 
(0.10) 
1.87 
(0.08) 
50-99 1.63 
(0.10) 
2.02*** 
(0.10) 
1.87 
(0.09) 
2.02 
(0.12) 
100-199 1.61 
(0.10) 
2.20*** 
(0.09) 
1.95 
(0.09) 
2.03 
(0.11) 
200-499 1.96 
(0.09) 
2.07 
(0.10) 
2.17 
(0.08) 
1.95 
(0.13) 
500 or more 2.13 
(0.13) 
2.25 
(0.10) 
2.19 
(0.11) 
2.16 
(0.11) 
Source: WERS 1990-1998 and 1998-2004 panel surveys. Base: Workplaces with 25 or more employees for 1990-1998 panel, and with 10 or 
more employees for the 1998-2004 panel. Figures are weighted and based on responses from at least 818 managers for the 1990-1998 panel 
and on at least 923 managers for the 1998-2004 panel. Workplace size relates to the point of data collection, and so workplaces could move 
from one size category to another between the first and second points in time ***indicates difference between the two observations significant 
at the 1 per cent level; **difference significant at the 5 per cent level; * difference significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Table A2. Summary of study hypotheses 
Outcome-related hypotheses: 
H1: Information disclosure will have an indirect positive effect on establishment financial performance through its 
positive impact on the climate of employee relations at the workplace. 
H2: Information disclosure will have a direct positive effect on establishment financial performance, above and 
beyond any indirect effect through the climate of employee relations at the workplace. 
 
Antecedent-related hypotheses: 
H3: Management will be more likely to disclose information in workplaces characterised by a more positive 
climate of employee relations. 
H4: Management will be more likely to disclose information when the financial performance of the establishment 
is poor. 
H5: Management will be more likely to disclose information where its level of sophistication is higher. 
H6: Management will be more likely to disclose information where it recognises a trade union for collective 
bargaining. 
H7: Management will be more likely to disclose information where there are join consultation arrangements in 
place in the workplace. 
H8: Management will be more likely to disclose information where there are direct participation arrangements in 
place in the workplace. 
H9: Management will be more likely to disclose information when disclosure was higher in the previous time 
period. 
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 Table A3. Independent and control variables: Descriptive statistics 
 1990-1998 panel 1998-2004 panel 
Variable description 1990 1998 1998 2004 
Independent variables:     
Above-average financial 
performance 
60% 
(3.8) 
51%* 
(3.9) 
62% 
(3.9) 
42%*** 
(4.1) 
Above-average climate 53% 
(2.8) 
61%*** 
(2.6) 
92% 
(2.0) 
94% 
(1.2) 
Management sophistication 
index (average of 3 items) 
1.78 
(0.07) 
1.94* 
(0.07) 
1.54 
(0.08) 
1.60 
(0.07) 
Direct participation 63% 
(2.7) 
72% 
(2.5) 
60% 
(3.7) 
71%** 
(3.3) 
Joint consultative committee 34% 
(2.6) 
39% 
(2.7) 
20% 
(2.2) 
23% 
(2.5) 
Union recognition 56% 
(2.8) 
55% 
(2.8) 
37% 
(3.4) 
43%*** 
(3.5) 
Control variables:     
Shocks index (average of 7 
items) 
 1.38 
(0.07) 
 1.46 
(0.09) 
Single independent 
establishment 
19% 
(2.3) 
20% 
(2.3) 
30% 
(3.4) 
28% 
(3.5) 
Private sector 62% 
(2.8) 
64%** 
(2.8) 
74% 
(2.8) 
76%** 
(2.7) 
Proportion of workforce female 49% 
(2.0) 
49% 
(2.0) 
55% 
(2.0) 
55% 
(2.1) 
Workplace size (employees):     
10-24 - - 52% 
(3.5) 
42%*** 
(3.9) 
25-49 47% 
(2.9) 
43%* 
(2.9) 
22% 
(2.4) 
28%** 
(2.9) 
50-99 28% 
(2.3) 
30% 
(2.5) 
15% 
(1.5) 
15% 
(1.8) 
100-199 15% 
(1.4) 
15% 
(1.5) 
7% 
(0.7) 
9% 
(1.4) 
200-499 7% 
(0.7) 
11%*** 
(1.2) 
3% 
(0.4) 
4%* 
(0.6) 
500 or more 3% 
(0.3) 
3% 
(0.4) 
1% 
(0.1) 
2%*** 
(0.2) 
Source: WERS 1990-1998 and 1998-2004 panel surveys. Base: Workplaces with 25 or more employees for 1990-1998 panel, and with 10 or 
more employees for the 1998-2004 panel. Figures are weighted and based on responses from at least 387 managers for the 1990-1998 panel 
and on at least 737 managers for the 1998-2004 panel. Standard errors in parentheses. The picture of stability in information disclosure over 
the period from 1998 to 2004 was also observed when the sample was restricted to workplaces with 25 or more employees. ***indicates 
difference between the two observations significant at the 1 per cent level; **difference significant at the 5 per cent level; * difference 
significant at the 10 per cent level. 
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 Table A4. Outcomes of information disclosure: Regression results for 
1990-1998 and 1998-2004 
 Dependent variables 
 1990-1998 panel 1998-2004 panel* 
Independent variables 1 
ER climate 1998 
2 
Financial 
performance 
1998 
3 
ER climate 2004 
4 
Financial 
performance 
2004 
Information disclosure 1990 0.022 0.204†   
ER Climate 1990 0.779*** 0.033   
Financial Performance 1990 -0.109 0.495*   
Management Sophistication 
1990 
-0.012 -0.041   
Trade Union Recognition 1990 0.034 -0.354   
Joint Consultation 1990 0.126 0.060   
Direct Participation 1990 -0.033 0.118   
Number of cases 391 338   
     
Information disclosure 1998   0.105 0.138 
ER Climate 1998   0.070 -0.223 
Financial Performance 1998   0.012 -0.304 
Management Sophistication 
1998 
  -0.084 0.004 
Trade Union Recognition 1998   0.159 -0.449†
Joint Consultation 1998   -0.076 0.057 
Direct Participation 1998   0.045 -0.084 
Number of cases   782 719 
Source: WERS 1990-1998 and 1998-2004 panel surveys. Base: Workplaces with 25 or more employees for 1990-1998 panel, and with 10 or 
more employees for the 1998-2004 panel. Figures are weighted and based on responses from at least 338 managers for the 1990-1998 panel 
and on at least 719 managers for the 1998-2004 panel. Figures in table are unstandardised beta coefficients. *** significant at the 0.1 per cent 
level; ** significant at the 1 per cent level; * significant at the 5 per cent level; + significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Note: For ease of presentation, only the unstandardised beta coefficients for the relevant independent variables are shown in the table. 
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 Table A5. Antecedents of information disclosure: Regression results for 
1990-1998 and 1998-2004 
 Dependent variables 
 1990-1998 panel 1998-2004 panel 
Independent variables 1 
Information Disclosure 1998 
2 
Information Disclosure 2004 
Information disclosure 1990 0.332***  
ER Climate 1990 0.075  
Financial Performance 1990 -0.163  
Management Sophistication 1990 0.261*  
Trade Union Recognition 1990 -0.125  
Joint Consultation 1990 0.453*  
Direct Participation 1990 0.059  
Number of cases 388  
   
Information disclosure 1998  0.219** 
ER Climate 1998  -0.174 
Financial Performance 1998  0.266†
Management Sophistication 1998  0.100 
Trade Union Recognition 1998  0.094 
Joint Consultation 1998  0.091 
Direct Participation 1998  0.122 
Number of cases  771 
Source: WERS 1990-1998 and 1998-2004 panel surveys. Base: Workplaces with 25 or more employees for 1990-1998 panel, and with 10 or 
more employees for the 1998-2004 panel. Figures are weighted and based on responses from at least 388 managers for the 1990-1998 panel 
and on at least 771 managers for the 1998-2004 panel. Figures in table are unstandardised beta coefficients. *** significant at the 0.1 per cent 
level; ** significant at the 1 per cent level; * significant at the 5 per cent level; + significant at the 10 per cent level. 
 
 30
The DTI Employment 
Relations Research Series 
Reports published to date in the DTI Employment Relations Research 
Series are listed below. Adobe PDF copies can be downloaded either 
from the Employment Market Analysis and Research web pages:  
http://www.dti.gov.uk/employment/research-evaluation/errs  
(click on the ‘Employment Relations Research Series’ page) 
Or via the DTI Publications page: http://www.dti.gov.uk/publications  
(click ‘Browse by Subject’, then select ‘Employment Relations Research’) 
For printed copies, you can place an order via the DTI Publications page. 
Alternatively call the DTI Publications Orderline on 0845 015 0010  
(+44 845 015 0010) and provide the URN, or email them at: 
publications@dti.gov.uk  with your details. 
Anyone wishing to be added to our mailing list for printed copies of this 
series should email their details to us at: emar@dti.gov.uk
 
No. 1   Involving employees in Total Quality Management: 
employee attitudes and organisational context in unionised 
environments. Margaret Collinson, Chris Rees, Paul Edwards with Linda 
Inness.  URN 98/507. June 1998 
No. 2   Industrial Tribunals, workplace disciplinary procedures and 
employment practice. Jill Earnshaw, John Goodman, Robin Harrison and 
Mick Marchington.  URN 98/564. February 1998 
No. 3   The dynamics of union membership in Britain – a study 
using the Family and Working Lives survey. Richard Disney, Amanda 
Gosling, Julian McCrae and Stephen Machin.  URN 98/807. January 1999 
No. 4   The individualisation of employment contracts in Britain. 
William Brown, Simon Deakin, Maria Hudson, Cliff Pratten and Paul 
Ryan. URN 98/943.  February 1999 
No. 5   Redundancy consultation: a study of current practice and 
the effects of the Regulations. Jill Smith, Paul Edwards and Mark Hall. 
URN 99/512. July 1999 
No. 6   The employment status of individuals in non-standard 
employment.  Brendan Burchell, Simon Deakin and Sheila Honey. URN 
99/770. July 1999 
No. 7   Partnership at work.  John Knell.  URN 99/1078.  September 
1999 
 31
No. 8   Trends in earnings inequality and earnings mobility 1977-
1997: the impact of mobility on long-term inequality. Abigail McKnight. 
URN 00/534.  February 2000 
No. 9  Costs and benefits of European Works Councils Directive.  
Tina Weber, Peter Foster and Kursat Levent Egriboz.  URN 00/630.  
February 2000 
No. 10 Explaining the growth in the number of applications to 
Industrial Tribunals, 1972-1997. Simon Burgess, Carol Propper and 
Deborah Wilson. URN 00/624. April 2001 
No. 11 Implementation of the Working Time Regulations. Fiona 
Neathey and James Arrowsmith.  URN 01/682.  April 2001 
No. 12 Collective bargaining and workplace performance: an 
investigation using the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998. Alex 
Bryson and David Wilkinson.  URN 01/1224.  November 2001 
No. 13 Findings from the 1998 Survey of Employment Tribunal 
Applications (Surveys of Applicants and Employers).  URN 03/999.  
February 2004 
No. 14 Small firms' awareness and knowledge of individual 
employment rights. Robert Blackburn and Mark Hart.  URN 02/573.  
August 2002 
No. 15 Awareness, knowledge and exercise of individual 
employment rights.  Nigel Meager, Claire Tyers, Sarah Perryman, Jo Rick 
and Rebecca Willison.  URN 02/667.  February 2002 
No. 16 Working long hours: a review of the evidence. Volume 1 – 
Main report.  Volume 2 – Case studies (and appendices). J Kodz et al.  
URN: 03/1228.  November 2003 
No. 17 Evaluation of the Partnership at Work Fund.  Mike Terry and 
Jill Smith. URN 03/512.  May 2003 
No. 18 Retirement ages in the UK: a review of the literature. Pamela 
Meadows.  URN 03/820.  July 2003 
No. 19 Implementation of the Working Time Regulations: follow-up 
study. Fiona Neathey.  URN03/970.  July 2003 
No. 20 The impact of employment legislation on small firms: a case 
study analysis. Paul Edwards, Monder Ram and John Black. URN 
03/1095. September 2003 
No. 21  Employee voice and training at work: analysis of case 
studies and WERS98. Helen Rainbird, Jim Sutherland, Paul Edwards, 
Lesley Holly and Ann Munro.  URN 03/1063.  September 2003 
No. 22 The Second Work-Life Balance Study: Results from the 
Employer Survey. Stephen Woodland, Nadine Simmonds, Marie 
Thornby, Rory Fitzgerald and Alice McGee.  URN 03/1252.  October 2003 
 32
No. 23 The business context to long hours working. T, Hogarth, 
W.W. Daniel, A.P.Dickerson, D. Campbell, M.Wintherbotham, D. Vivian. 
URN 03/833. November 2003 
No. 24 Age matters: a review of the existing survey evidence. Dr. 
Peter Urwin. URN 03/1623.  February 2004 
No. 25 How employers manage absence. Stephen Bevan, Sally 
Dench, Heather Harper and Sue Hayday.  URN 04/553.  March 2004 
No. 26 The content of new voluntary trade union recognition 
agreements 1998-2002: Volume one – An analysis of new agreements 
and case studies. Dr Sian Moore, Dr Sonia McKay and Helen Bewley.  
URN 04/1084.  August 2004 
No. 27 The Second Work-Life Balance Study: Results from the 
Employees’ Survey. Jane Stevens, Juliet Brown and Caroline Lee.  URN 
04/740.  March 2004 
No. 28 2003 Compendium of Regulatory Impact Assessments. 
Employment Market Analysis and Research.  URN 04/743.  April 2004 
No. 29 Trade union recognition: statutory unfair labour practice 
regimes in the USA and Canada. John Godard.  URN 04/855.  March 2004 
No. 30 Equal opportunities policies and practices at the workplace: 
secondary analysis of WERS98. Tracy Anderson, Neil Millward and John 
Forth.  URN 04/836.  June 2004 
No. 31 A survey of workers’ experiences of the Working Time 
Regulations. BMRB Social Research.  URN 04/1165.  November 2004 
No. 32 The evaluation of the Work-Life Balance Challenge Fund. 
Adrian Nelson, Kathryn Nemec, Pernille Solvik and Chris Ramsden.   
URN 04/1043.  August 2004 
No. 33 Findings from the Survey of Employment Tribunal 
Applications 2003. Bruce Hayward, Mark Peters, Nicola Rousseau and 
Ken Seeds.   URN 04/1071.  August 2004 
No. 34 Employment relations monitoring and evaluation plan 2004. 
Employment Market Analysis and Research. URN 04/1256.  September 
2004 
No. 35 Findings from the 1998 survey of representatives in Employment 
Tribunal cases. P.L.Latreille, J.A. Latreille and K.G. Knight. URN 04/1530.  
August 2004 
No. 36 Employment attitudes: Main findings from the British Social 
Attitudes Survey 2003. Harjinder Kaur.  URN 04/1868.  December 2004 
No. 37 Job separations: A survey of workers who have recently left 
any employer. Volume one – Main analysis report. Tania Corbin. URN 
04/1920.  December 2004 
No. 39 Results of the Second Flexible Working Employee Survey. 
Heather Holt and Heidi Grainger.  URN 05/606.  April 2005 
 33
No. 40 2002 Compendium of Regulatory Impact Assessments. 
Employment Market Analysis and Research.   URN 05/582.  April 2005 
No. 41 2004 Compendium of Regulatory Impact Assessments. 
Employment Market Analysis and Research.   URN 05/1018.  April 2005 
No. 42 The age dimension of employment practices: employer case 
studies. Stephen McNair and Matt Flynn.  URN 05/863.  June 2005 
No. 43 The content of new voluntary trade union recognition 
agreements 1998-2002. Volume two – Findings from the survey of 
employers. Dr Sian Moore, Dr Sonia McKay and Helen Bewley.  URN 
05/1020. May 2005 
No. 44 Employment Relations monitoring and evaluation plan 2005, 
Employment Market Analysis and Research.  URN 05/1019. July 2005 
No. 45 Review of research into the impact of employment relations 
legislation. Linda Dickens, Mark Hall and Professor Stephen Wood. URN 
05/1257. October 2005 
No. 46 People, Strategy ad Performance: Results from the Second 
Work and Enterprise Business Survey. The Work Foundation.  URN 
05/1392.  September 2005 
No. 47 ‘Small, flexible and family friendly’ – work practices in 
service sector businesses. Lynette Harris and Carley Foster URN 05/1491.  
October 2005 
No. 48 2005 Compendium of Regulatory Impact Assessments. 
Volume 1 and Volume 2.  Employment Market Analysis and Research.  
URN 06/627 (Volume 1) and 06/669X (Volume 2).  March 2006 
No. 49 Survey of employers’ policies, practices and preferences 
relating to age. Hilary Metcalf and Pamela Meadows.  URN 05/674.  April 
2006 
No. 50 Maternity and paternity rights and benefits: survey of 
parents 2005. Deborah Smeaton and Alan Marsh.  URN 06/836.  March 
2006. 
No. 51 Employment Rights at Work: Survey of Employees.  Jo 
Casebourne, Jo Regan, Fiona Neathey, Siobhan Tuohy.  URN 06/ 837.  
April 2006. 
No. 52 2001 Compendium of Regulatory Impact Assessments. 
Employment Market Analysis and Research.  URN 06/927.  July 2006 
No. 53 1999 Compendium of Regulatory Impact Assessments. 
Employment Market Analysis and Research.  URN 06/955.  July 2006 
No. 54 Findings from the Survey of Claimants in Race 
Discrimination Employment Tribunal Cases. URN 06/1059. Mark Peters, 
Ken Seeds and Carrie Harding. September 2006 
 34
No. 55 The Experience of Claimants in Race Discrimination 
Employment Tribunal Cases. Jane Aston, Darcy Hill and Nil Djan Tackey. 
URN 06/1060. April 2006 
No. 56 How have employees fared?  Recent UK trends.  Grant 
Fitzner.  URN 06/924.  June 2006 
No. 57 International review of leave policies and related research. 
Peter Moss and Margaret O'Brien (editors).  URN 06/1422.  June 2006 
No. 58 The Third Work-Life Balance Employees Survey: Executive 
summary. URN 06/1372/ES.  July 2006 
No. 60 2000 Compendium of Regulatory Impact Assessments. 
Employment Market Analysis and Research.  URN 06/1164.  July 2006 
No. 63 The First Fair Treatment at Work Survey: Executive 
summary.  Heidi Grainger and Grant Fitzner.  URN 06/1380.  June 2006 
No. 64 Review of judgments in race discrimination Employment 
Tribunal cases. Alison Brown, Angus Erskine and Doris Littlejohn. URN 
06/1691. September 2006 
No. 65 Employment flexibility and UK regional unemployment: 
persistence and macroeconomic shocks. Vassilis Monastiriotis. 06/1799. 
December 2006 
No. 66  Labour market flexibility and sectoral productivity: a 
comparative study. Vassilis Monastiriotis. 06/1799. December 2006 
No. 67 1997-1998 Compendium of Regulatory Impact Assessments. 
Employment Market Analysis and Research.  URN 06/1840.  September 
2006 
No. 68 Union modernisation fund: interim evaluation of first round. 
Mark Stuart, Andy Charlwood, Miguel Martinez Lucio and Emma Wallis. 
URN 06/1803.  September 2006 
No. 69 Employee representation in grievance and disciplinary 
matters – making a difference? Richard Saundry and Valerie Antcliff. 
URN 06/2126. December 2006 
No. 70 Changing job quality in Great Britain 1998 – 2004. Andrew 
Brown, Andy Charlwood, Christopher Forde and David Spencer. URN 
06/2125. December 2006 
No. 72 Embedding the provision of information and consultation in 
the workplace: a longitudinal analysis of employee outcomes in 1998 and 
2004. Annette Cox, Mick Marchington and Jane Suter. URN 07/598. 
February 2007 
No. 73 Patterns of information disclosure and joint consultation in 
Great Britain – determinants and outcomes. Riccardo Peccei, Helen 
Bewley, Howard Gospel and Paul Willman. URN 07/599. February 2007 
 
 35
Printed in the UK on recycled paper with a minimum HMSO score of 75.
First published 2007. Department of Trade and Industry. © Crown Copyright. www.dti.gov.uk
ISBN: 978-0-85605-683-3  0.85k/01/07/NP. URN 07/599
DTIEmploymentSeries73  22/1/07  10:48  Page 1
